TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/010289/01028900.044

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 8.0 KB | 150 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 81    

MIDDLE EAST


    Barely visible behind a lectern in Tel Aviv's Yad Eliyahu
basketball arena, the diminutive Yitzhak Shamir struggled to
make his voice heard. His Likud bloc must agree to share power
with Labor, he pleaded, "to be united against the danger of a
Palestinian state." But even that potent argument elicited
little but jeers from hundreds of angry members of the
right-wing Likud bloc's central committee. Cheers rang out only
when Ariel Sharon, the big and assertive leader of the party's
hard-liners, called for a narrow coalition without left-leaning
Labor. "People in Labor say we must talk to the P.L.O.," he
shouted. "That is not our stance." The raucous crowd screamed
back its approval.

    But shortly after 3 a.m. last Wednesday, party members
grudgingly capitulated to Shamir's proposal to form another
national-unity government with the Labor Party. Shamir had vowed
to give up his mandate to form a government if he lost. Later
the same day, Labor's central committee, also divided over the
wisdom of the party's casting its lot with Likud, ratified the
coalition proposal. Seven weeks of wrangling followed
inconclusive elections on Nov. 1, but the U.S. decision to open a
dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization precipitated
Israel's warring leaders into a second consecutive government
of opposing ideologies. The two parties converged on one
overriding fundamental: no dealing with the P.L.O.

    The new government may be called national unity, but it will
lean distinctly to the right. Both parties agreed to strict
limits on the steps Israel would take toward peace. In a
nine-page coalition contract, Likud and Labor flatly rejected
recent proposals in P.L.O. chairman Yasser Arafat's peace
campaign, saying the Israeli government "will not negotiate
with the P.L.O." Instead, the pact reiterated Likud's
long-standing call for direct talks with Israel's Arab
neighbors, such as Jordan, and adopted Labor's offer to include
non-P.L.O. Palestinians who live in the occupied territories.
"We must do everything to say to America, to the Soviet Union,
to Europe, to the Arabs, that in this difficult hour the people
of Israel are united and forming one government," declared the
new Prime Minister.

    Shamir is the clear winner in Israel's battle to control a
new and more complicated diplomatic environment. To cement his
authority, Shamir refused to repeat the 1984 unity agreement
under which each party in turn held the Prime Minister's chair.
Reinforcing the government's shift to the right is the
appointment of Likud's Moshe Arens, the hawkish former
Ambassador to Washington, to replace Labor leader Shimon Peres
as Foreign Minister in Shamir's 26-member Cabinet. Peres, under
strong pressure from his party to ensure a government bailout of
the troubled Histadrut labor federation and the kibbutz
movement, the twin pillars of Labor support, opted instead for
the finance portfolio. Peres insists he will continue to speak
out on foreign policy issues as leader of the Labor Party. But
it will be Shamir and Arens who finally give Israel one
official voice on diplomatic matters.

    That means the U.S. is likely to hear nothing other than
Shamir's intransigent line. The Prime Minister fervently
believes a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
would be just the first victory in a P.L.O. war to devour all of
Israel. Thus he has found reasons to resist virtually all plans
for peace talks, since they inevitably call for a trade of
Israeli-occupied land for peace. Shamir's prime objective is to
prevent the Palestinian initiative from advancing further and
keep the door closed to the risk of negotiations.

    Yet Israeli leaders are acutely aware the P.L.O. is winning
the propaganda war. Said Foreign Ministry spokesman Alon Liel:
"Israel has to come up with ideas in order to reverse the
momentum." To that end, Israel is not likely to crack down
harder on the Palestinian uprising in the territories as long as
the level of violence rises no higher. Already under pressure
from Western allies, Israel does not want to infuriate them
further with draconian measures. That may be one reason Shamir
has kept Labor's Yitzhak Rabin as Defense Minister, thwarting
Sharon's intense campaign for the post. The ambitious Sharon,
Shamir's archrival for control of Likud, has long boasted
privately that he could end the intifadeh in a week.

    Also losing out were the four religious parties, which won
18 Knesset seats. Shamir's initial plan of forming a government
with them rather than Labor disintegrated amid the new
diplomatic pressures and strong opposition from American Jews to
the four parties' demands for stricter religious observance.

    In Washington, U.S. officials expressed relief that the
Labor Party may continue to exert a moderating influence in the
Israeli government. They feel that despite Israel's clear
rejection of Arafat's initiative, peace negotiations may
eventually begin if the P.L.O. can back up its talk of
compromise with deeds. The U.S. plan, subject to adjustment
after George Bush becomes President on Jan. 20, calls first for
collecting proof that Arafat is keeping his pledge to halt
P.L.O. terrorism. The U.S. hopes that after about six months
this period of restraint will convince the Israelis that Arafat
is sincere in recognizing Israel's right to exist and that he
can be bargained with. At that point, the U.S. Administration
will have to find enough political will and diplomatic muscle to
persuade a reluctant Israel to enter into negotiations. For 40
years Israel has preferred to say no to the U.S. as little as
possible. But the two allies could face an unprecedented
showdown unless the Bush team can figure out how to lure Israel
into negotiations without a major rupture.

    The U.S. is also urging Israel, so far without any success,
to ease its iron-fist handling of the year-old intifadeh and
grant limited autonomy to the 1.7 million Palestinians living
under occupation. "They need to do things to make the
Palestinians feel more human, more in control of their lives,"
says a U.S. official. Meanwhile, the uprising has reached a
stalemate: the intifadeh can't defeat Israel's occupation, but
Israel can't stop the rebellion.

    The P.L.O. chairman does not have a notably easier agenda.
As Arafat met with a host of world leaders, including Pope John
Paul II, his aides said he was concerned that terrorism could
doom his peace efforts, particularly if that initiative failed
to produce results. In Damascus, Arafat's actions were
condemned by two Syrian-backed Palestinian renegade leaders,
Ahmed Jabril and Colonel Said Musa. Both have been accused by
the U.S. of masterminding terrorist attacks.

    Arafat has set an ambitious target: an independent
Palestinian state by 1991. To speed diplomacy along, he plans to
have P.L.O. officials unveil new proposals when they hold their
second meeting with Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. Ambassador to
Tunisia. One is an international conference on terrorism that
would enable Arafat to dramatize his promises. Another
overture, an acutely sensitive one, might be an offer to help
prevent terrorist acts by exchanging intelligence information
with the U.S. Meanwhile, Arafat wants to reach early agreement
with King Hussein on the outline of a U.S.-backed
Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

    But given Israel's position, Arafat is not likely to need
such a detailed blueprint anytime soon. Few in Israel are ready
-- yet -- to accept the seismic shift in attitude that has
occurred, especially in the U.S. Government. The Bush
Administration will be looking for a new mood in Jerusalem as
well as a new government. But Shamir is unlikely to soften:
Israel now appears to have a government that prefers territory
to peace. And the overwhelming majority of his countrymen back
Shamir in saying no to the P.L.O.